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KING OF THE HILL: OHIO VALLEY ENVIRONMENTAL
COALITION V ARA COMA COAL COMPANY AND THE BATTLE
RAGING BETWEEN THE COAL INDUSTRY AND
ENVIRONMENTALISTS OVER MOUNTAINTOP MINING
I.

INTRODUCTION

Not long after being sworn into office, President Obama delivered remarks at the White House regarding what he called the single most fundamental issue concerning our nation's future:
energy.1 Obama spoke of the need for energy independence primarily because dependence on foreign oil may fuel threats to national security.2 The President stated that the purchase of foreign
oil can bankroll dictators, pay for nuclear proliferation and fund
terrorism. 3 For decades, Obama said, presidents have warned the
country about the costs of relying on foreign oil and have vowed to
attain energy independence. 4 Over the years, however, the United
States has gone from importing about one-third of its oil from for5
eign countries to now importing nearly half.
The prevalence of coal-generated electricity in the U.S. should
be an important consideration as part of the Obama Administra-

1. President Barack Obama, Address at White House on Achieving Energy
Independence (Jan. 26, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/200 9 / O1/26/AR2009012601147.html?sid=ST2009
01260117) (highlighting importance of energy in United States' future).
2. See id. (suggesting that pumping money into foreign countries for oil benefits terrorist operations in Middle East region where much of the oil is located).
3. See id. (observing that dependence on foreign oil subjects Americans to
fluctuating gas price due to unstable regions, and stifles competition and
innovation).
4. See id. (discussing President Nixon's promise to make United States energy
independent by end of 1970s).
5. See id. (addressing increase in energy dependence since 1970s when Nixon
promised independence). The President went on to proclaim that the policy of
his new Administration will be to reverse the trend of dependence on foreign oil
and no longer risk the peril that comes with dependence. See id. The President
stated,
Now America has arrived at a crossroads embedded in American soil, in
the wind and in the sun, we have the resources to change. Our scientists,
businesses and workers have the capacity to move us forward. It falls on
us... [a] nd for the sake of our security, our economy and our planet, we
must have the courage and commitment to change.
Id.

(293)
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tion's plan to become energy independent. 6 In 2007, coal was responsible for generating nearly half of U.S. energy,7 with more than
one-third of the country's coal coming from the Appalachian region. 8 Specifically, West Virginia, produces the second most coal of
any state, behind Wyoming. 9 Not only is coal prevalent in the U.S.,
but it is also inexpensive compared to petroleum or natural gas.10
Coal can be extracted by underground mining or by surface mining; the latter has become a popular means by which to extract coal
in recent decades and accounts for roughly two-thirds of the nation's coal production.'1 Mountaintop mining, a form of surface
mining particularly popular in Appalachia, is responsible for approximately ten percent of the country's coal and about forty per12
cent of coal mined in West Virginia and Kentucky.
As the practice of mountaintop mining has increased in recent
years, so too has opposition to the practice, with numerous environmental groups suing in an attempt to curb a practice that many
view as overly destructive. 13 An environmental group will often
bring suit against the coal company operating the specific mining
site at issue and the various agencies that are responsible for issuing
permits to the companies that allow the mountaintop mining to

6. See National

Mining

Association,

Fast Facts About

Coal, http://

www.nma.org/statistics/fast-facts.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2010) (noting that
about half of U.S. electricity is generated from coal).
7. Energy Information Administration, Coal Infocard 2007,

http://

(last visited
tonto.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/infocard/coal-infocard.html
Mar. 21, 2010) (displaying statistic that coal generated 48.5% of U.S. electric energy in 2007).
8. See id. (highlighting that 33.7% of U.S. coal was produced in Appalachia in
2007).
9. West Virginia Coal Association, Coal Facts 2008, http://www.wvcoal.com/

docs/coalfacts_08.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2010) (evidencing abundance of coal
mining operations in West Virginia).
10. See National Mining Association, supra note 6 (describing coal as most af-

fordable source of power fuel per million Btu, averaging less than one-quarter of
price of petroleum and natural gas).
11. See id. (noting increase in use of surface mining technique versus underground mining).

12. See id. (displaying prevalence of mountaintop mining in Appalachia).
13. See Matthew Ahrens et al., Major Developments in Section 404 Permitting,

CoAL AGE, June 2009, at 44, available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/
_pdf/pub2736_1.pdf (discussing environmentalist groups' active involvement in

challenging mountaintop mining activities); see also Raucous Pro-Coal Crowds Pack
Mining Hearings,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
aponline/2009/10/13/business/AP-US-Mountaintop-Mining.html?_r= 1 &scp=l &
sq=mountaintop%20mining&st=cse (chronicling rift between coal industry and
environmentalists groups over practice of mountaintop mining).
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occur. 14 This Note addresses one such case-Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Company (Aracoma Coal).15 Aracoma
Coal involves four permits issued by the United States Army Corps
of Engineers (the Corps), allowing for certain mountaintop mining
processes at four mining sites in West Virginia.' 6 In February 2009,
the Fourth Circuit, in a controversial decision, overturned a 2007
order to vacate the four permits by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia and held that the four permits
17
issued by the Corps were valid.
This Note analyzes the Fourth Circuit's decision in Aracoma
Coal. Part II of this Note provides the factual basis important for
understanding the technique of mountaintop mining and introduces some of the key players in the dispute and describes their
roles.' 8 Part III presents a brief overview of the statutory framework
that relates to mining regulations and the environmental statutes
that shape mining practices.' 9 Part IV describes the Fourth Circuit's analysis in reaching its conclusion to validate the four permits
issued by the Corps. 20 Part V analyzes and ultimately supports the
Fourth Circuit's decision to grant the Corps deference in the issuance of the permits. 2 1 Finally, Part VI discusses the possible ramifications of the Fourth Circuit's decision on the future practice of
mountaintop mining, and forecasts potential legislative action from
Washington in response to Aracoma Coal and mountaintop mining
22
in general.

14. See generally Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp.
2d 607, 615-16 (S.D. W.Va. 2007), rev'd, 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009) (challenging

Corps' issuance of permits for mountaintop mining activities).
15. 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009).
16. See Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 187-88 (describing permits issued by Corps

for mountaintop mining process).
17. See id. at 217 (reversing and vacating district court's decision to rescind
four challenged permits at issue).

18. For further discussion of the facts of Aracoma Coal, see infra notes 23-51
and accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of the legal background of Aracoma Coal, see infra
notes 52-108 and accompanying text.

20. For a narrative analysis of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Aracoma Coa4
see infra notes 109-51 and accompanying text.
21. For a critical analysis of the court's decision in Aracoma Coal see infra
notes 152-88 and accompanying text.

22. For further discussion of the impact of the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Aracoma Coa4 see infra notes 189-206 and accompanying text.
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FACTS

As the nation struggles to achieve energy independence,
mountaintop removal mining has become particularly widespread
in Appalachia over the last twenty years. 23 To reach coal deposits
layered horizontally within mountains, miners blast away soil and
rock on a mountaintop

to expose the coal. 24

At a typical

mountaintop site, a mining operation will clear miles of hardwood
forest, then drill holes and pack them with explosives to blast away
rock, reducing the elevation of the mountain by as much as 800
feet. 25 The soil and rock, known as "spoil," which were blasted

from atop the mountain, are removed and placed in adjacent valleys. 26 After the coal is excavated, the displaced spoil is reposi-

tioned back on top of the mountain in an effort to recreate the
mountain's original shape. 2 7 Due to stability issues associated with
placing the spoil back atop the mountain, the excess spoil, known
as "overburden," remains in the valleys, creating a "valley fill" that
28
buries intermittent and perennial streams.
In Aracoma Coal, several environmental groups in the Appalachian region, namely the Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition,
the Coal River Mountain Watch, and the West Virginia Highlands
Conservancy (collectively, OVEC) asserted various claims against
the Corps. 29 Although the Corps has no direct authority over
23. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607,
614-15 (S.D. W. Va. 2007) (noting increased popularity of mountaintop mining
since 1990s).
24. See id. at 615 (describing process of mountaintop mining); see also Aracoma
Coal, 556 F.3d at 186 (outlining process of mountaintop mining).
25. See Kris Maher, Mining Companies Hit Wall on Mountaintop Blasting, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 8, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/articleemail/SB10001424
052748703298004574459363401191286-1MyQjAxMDA5MDAwOTEwNDkyWj. html
(discussing mountaintop mining practice).
26. See Corps of Eng'rs,479 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (describing valley fill process); see
also Aracoma Coal 556 F.3d at 186 (noting valley fill process).
27. See Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (noting that mining operations
attempt to replace overburden spoil when feasible).
28. See Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 186 (explaining how valley fills are created in
associated with mountaintop mining). Water that collects in these fills must be
moved to ensure the fill's stability. See id. This is done by creating stream segments which channel the water out of the fill and into a sediment pond where the
sediment can settle out of the fill runoff, with the water eventually being discharged back into existing streams. See id. A great deal of the impact from valley
fills is felt by headwater streams, large streams, or rivers. See id. at 186-87. The
parties here disagree over the exact role that headwater streams play in the area's
overall ecology, but the parties do agree that headwater streams play an important
role in the area's ecology. See id.
29. See Corps of Eng'rs,479 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (naming parties in suit); see also
Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 185 (listing parties in same suit, on appeal).
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mountaintop removal mining, it has authority over the valley filling
process-a necessary component of the mountaintop mining process. 30 Authority to control the valley fill process is vested in the
Corps pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) .31
The CWA authorizes the Corps to issue permits for the disposal of
"dredge material" into "waters of the United States. ' 32 While
OVEC's claims were brought against the Corps' actions in issuing
the permits, a litany of interested parties-primarily coal companies and various industry interest groups in the region-joined as
33
Intervenors in the case.

From July 2005 through August 2006, the Corps issued four
separate CWA Section 404 permits to coal mining operations in
West Virginia. 34 The permits allowed mining operations to place
overburden spoil in various streams near the mining sites. 3

5

In the

instant case, OVEC challenged the four permits at issue in the District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. 36 The permits allowed for the filling of streams in conjunction with surface
area coal mining. 37 In the aggregate, the four permits granted permission for the construction of twenty-three valley fills, twenty-three

30. See Corps ofEng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (establishing Corps' indirect role
in mountaintop mining by highlighting Corps' control over process of permitting
valley fills used in mountaintop mining).
31. See id. (describing basis of Corps' authority to issue permits for valley fills).
32. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (vesting authority in Corps to issue § 404 permits for
disposal of certain material such as debris from mountaintop mining activities).
33. See, e.g., Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 177 (listing Intervenors in suit from coal
industry). The case's namesake, Aracoma Coal Company, operated Camp Branch
Mine, the first of the four mining sites to which the Corps issued a challenged
§ 404 permit. See id. at 187. The three subsequent mine operators and sites were
as follows: Elk Run Coal Company's Black Castle Mine, Alex Energy's Republic No.
2 Mine, and Independence Coal Company's Laxare East Mine. Id. Each of the
affected mining companies intervened as defendants in the suit, along with the
West Virginia Coal Association. Id.
34. See Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (describing timing of § 404 permits issued by Corps to various mining operations); see also Aracoma Coa4 556 F.3d
at 187-88 (outlining timeline of permits issued by Corps and challenges to permits
brought by OVEC).
35. See Aracoma Coa4 556 F.3d at 187 (discussing fill activities authorized by
permits at issue).
36. See id. at 187-89 (noting procedural posture of suit). OVEC's challenges
began in September 2005 when it challenged the first of four permits issued by the
Corps in July 2005. See id. at 187. OVEC then amended its complaint with each
subsequent permit issued by the Corps to individual mining operations, culminating in August of 2006 with challenges to four individual § 404 permits issued to
four separate coal mining operations during the thirteen month period. See id.
37. See id. at 186-87 (explaining activity that § 404 permits allow).
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sediment ponds, and impacted 68,841 linear feet of intermittent
38
and ephemeral streams, spanning over thirteen miles.
OVEC's claims against the Corps arose under the CWA and
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 39 OVEC claimed that
the Corps' issuance of the four Section 404 permits violated the
CWA and NEPA, and were "arbitrary and capricious, and an abuse
4
of discretion" under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 0
Given the adverse environmental effects that the proposed projects
would have, OVEC asserted that the Corps was required under
NEPA to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for
each of the four projects prior to issuing a permit. 41 OVEC further
claimed that the Corps did not properly determine the individual
and cumulative adverse impacts on the affected aquatic ecosystems
in accordance with the CWA and the Corps' own guidelines. 4 2 Conversely, the Corps contended that it was entitled to deference in its
determinations regarding its various actions, including the scope of
its NEPA analysis and interpretation of its own guidelines. 43 The
Corps further stated that its findings related to the individual and

38. Id. at 187 (describing cumulative results that four permits at issue would
authorize). For a description of valley fills and sediment ponds, see supra note 28
and accompanying text. The Camp Branch mine included four valley fills impacting 15,059 linear feet of streams (both intermittent and ephemeral), along
with four sediment ponds that would temporarily impound another 455 linear feet
of streams. Aracoma Coa 556 F.3d at 187. Black Castle included nine valley fills,
impacting 13,401 linear feet of streams, also with six sediment ponds, temporarily
impounding an additional 879 feet of streams. Id. Republic No. 2 called for three
valley fills, affecting 9,918 linear feet of streams, with three sediment ponds temporarily impacting 690 linear feet of streams. Id. Finally, Laxare East involved seven
valley fills, impacting 24,860 linear feet of streams, along with ten sediment ponds,
temporarily affecting 3,099 linear feet of streams. Id.
39. See Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 616 (listing statutes under which
OVEC's challenge was brought); see also Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 188-89 (noting
various statutes under which claims were brought).
40. Aracoma Coa 556 F.3d at 187-88.
41. See id. at 187-88 (discussion OVEC's claims against Corps). OVEC's claim
suggested that the proposed projects would affect water quality, aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems and habitats, species survival and diversity, crucial stream functions, forests, and the aesthetic value of the destroyed mountains. See id.
42. See id. at 188 (noting OVEC's CWA claims). For further discussion of
Corps' guidelines in association with the CWA, see infra note 63 and accompanying text.
43. See id. at 188-89 (noting Corps' argument on appeal that scope of its analysis was proper and that its various findings regarding impacts of activity and plans
to mitigate level of impacts below level of significance were not arbitrary or capricious and thus were entitled to deference).
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cumulative impacts and its mitigation plans were not arbitrary or
44
capricious.
In March 2007, the district court found in favor of OVEC and
held that the Corps failed to comply with the CWA and NEPA when
it issued the four permits. 45 The court further noted that a CWA

Section 404 permit may not be issued if the Corps fails to comply
with its own guidelines and with NEPA when making a finding of
no significant impact (FONSI) or performing an EIS. 46 The court

remanded the permits to the Corps for further consideration in
light of its findings. 4 7 The court also rescinded the four permits,
enjoining the Corps and Intervenors from taking any action under
48
the challenged permits.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order and held that the Corps did not violate the CWA or NEPA in its

44. See id. at 188-89 (establishing Corps' claims on appeal). Intervenors raised
the same challenges as the Corps in order to partake in the litigation. See id. at
189.
45. See Corps of Eng'rs,479 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (holding in favor of OVEC). The
district court found that the likely impacts of the valley fills would be significant
and adverse; the mitigation plans for each permit were not sufficient to compensate for the impacts; the Corps should have considered broader impact of entire
valley fill project, instead of limiting its NEPA scope to the impact on jurisdictional
waters; and the Corps' evaluation of the cumulative impacts of the projects was
insufficient. See id. at 663.
46. See id. at 662-63 (observing that Corps did not adequately review certain
environmental impact issues as required by CWA and NEPA, and Corps' failure to
conduct proper reviews and make FONSI was incorrect, meaning a full EIS may
have been required).
47. See id. at 663 (discussing potential remedies; court opted to remand permits to Corps instead of directing Corps to prepare full EISs for each permit
application).
48. See Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 188 (noting that district court later granted
Intervenor's request for limited stay on injunctions for some fills, "provided that
Intervenors complied with all conditions, including mitigation requirements of the
permits"). In a separate ruling, in June 2007, the district court granted summary
judgment to OVEC on its claim seeking a declaratory judgment that the stream
segments created to channel runoff from the valley fills to the sediment ponds
were "waters of the United States," and thus the Corps did not have authority to
permit the discharge of pollutants into the stream segments with a CWA § 404
permit. See id. at 188. The district court granted OVEC's request for declaratory
judgment, finding that the stream segments were "waters of the United States,"
meaning that mining operators needed a CWA § 402 permit, and that the Corps
lacked authority to permit such discharge. See id. The Fourth Circuit reversed and
granted the Corps declaratory relief on this issue in Aracoma Coal. See id. at 186.
Although this is an important issue relating to valley fill permits and mountaintop
removal mining, this Note does not address the issue relating to the court's determination of what is considered "waters of the United States." For further discussion of the issue, see id. at 209-16.
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issuance of the four valley fill permits. 49 The Fourth Circuit overturned the lower court's ruling, holding that the Corps did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in conducting its various impact analyses
50
for the permits and proposed plans associated with the permits.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Corps' issuance of the Section 404 permits to the four mining operations was within the
Corps' authority under the CWA and NEPA.51
III.

BACKGROUND

This case is one in a long line involving the mountaintop mining process.5 2 Typically, an environmentalist group will bring suit
against the coal company operating a mining site and the various
government agencies that regulate the activities necessary for
mountaintop mining. 53 As with many suits implicating questions of
49. See id. at 186 (finding that district court did not grant proper deference to
Corps' actions and that in consideration of proper level of deference, Corps did
not violate CWA or NEPA when issuing challenged permits).
50. See id. (overruling district court and holding that Corps acted within its
discretion in granting permits at issue). The proposed plans associated with the
permitted fill activities primarily included mitigating measures adopted to reduce
the level of adverse impact below a level of significance, thus justifying a finding of
no significant impact (FONSI), after considering mitigation. See id. at 207.
51. See id. at 186 (reversing district court orders; vacating district court's injunction on four mining operations; reversing and remanding district court's grant
of declaratory relief on issue of stream segments being categorized as "waters of
the United States").
52. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868-69 (S.D.
W. Va. 2009) (listing line of cases challenging mountain top mining in Southern
Appalachia); see, e.g.,
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Kempthrone, 473 F.3d 94 (4th Cir.

2006) (challenging mountaintop mining activities); see, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal.
v. Bulen, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (highlighting challenge to mining
permits); see, e.g., Kentuckians for the Commw. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927
(S.D. W. Va. 2002) (challenging mining permits). The suits are typically initiated
by the environmental groups because of the alleged detrimental effects the mining
has on local waterways. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 869. As the judge in one
mountaintop mining case explained:
The normal flow and gradient of the stream is now buried under millions
of cubic yards of excess spoil waste material, an extremely adverse effect.
If there are fish, they cannot migrate. If there is any life form that cannot
acclimate to life deep in a rubble pile, it is eliminated. No effect on related environmental values is more adverse than obliteration. Under a
valley fill, the water quality of the stream becomes zero. Because there is
no stream there is no water equality.
Bragg v. Robertson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 635, 661-62 (S.D. W. Va. 1999), affd in part,
vacated in part, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001).
53. See Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (discussing Corps' involvement
in mountaintop mining process that makes suits against Agency possible). Although the Corps does not have direct regulatory authority over the mountaintop
removal process, it plays an indirect, yet crucial, role with its control over a necessary byproduct of the mountaintop removal process: valley fills. See id. Section 404
of the CWA allows the Corps to control this aspect of the mining process by issuing
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environmental law, challenges brought against mining operations
and agencies require courts to address a complex web of statutes
and regulations. 54 As Judge Gregory keenly observed before delving into his fifty-page majority opinion, "A complex statutory framework undergirds the regulation of valley fills and associated
sediment ponds . .. .55
A. The Statutory Framework of Challenges to the Corps' Agency
Actions
Four statutes contribute to the scope of the Corps' authority to
issue valley fill permits: the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 5 6 the APA, the CWA, and NEPA. 57 Specifically, a court reviewing a Corps-issued valley fill permit must
consider whether the permit was issued in accordance with the
CWA and NEPA, with the APA serving as a tool for judicial review
§ 404 permits for the disposal of spoil into surrounding streams. See id. If a
mountaintop mining operation is unable to obtain a § 404 permit from the Corps,
discharging overburden spoil would be prohibited, meaning that the construction
of valley fills would be precluded, thus making mountaintop mining as it is done
today impossible. See id.
54. See, e.g., Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 189 (establishing statutory framework
that provides foundation for court's opinion); see also Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp.
2d at 623-26 (addressing statutory background of CWA and NEPA); see also Hurst,
604 F. Supp. 2d at 869-72 (explaining statutory considerations of CWA and NEPA
required by court).
55. See Aracoma Coal 556 F.3d at 189 (prefacing opinion with explanation of
statutory framework behind challenges to mountaintop mining operations).
56. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (2006). Congress passed the SMCRA with dual, yet competing, goals in
mind: to "establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment
from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations," while also recognizing
the need to "strike a balance between protection of the environment and agricultural productivity and the Nation's need for coal as an essential source of energy."
See 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a), (f) (2006). A SMCRA permit requires excess spoil to be
disposed of in a "controlled manner" to ensure stability. See 30 U.S.C.
1265(b) (22) (A) (2006). A SMCRA permit alone, however, is insufficient to allow
mining operations to construct valley fills during mountaintop removals. See
Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 190. Mining operations must also obtain a CWA permit
in order to construct a valley fill. See id. Specifically, a CWA § 404 permit is required for valley fills to allow the discharging of spoil into local waters. See id.
(citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006)). The Corps then becomes involved in the process as the agency with the authority to issue § 404 permits. See id. at 190-91. The
Corps uses § 404 permits to authorize the construction of valley fills and sediment
ponds and follows guidelines promulgated by the EPA pursuant to 33 U.S.C
§ 1344(b)(1) (2006) which has been adopted into the Corps' own guidelines
under 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2008). See id. at 191. NEPA comes into play when the
Corps reviews the permits for CWA compliance. See id.
57. See Aracoma Coa4 556 F.3d at 189 (explaining role CWA and NEPA play in
this litigation).
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when assessing claims against agency actions. 58 The APA mandates
that a reviewing court must set aside an agency action if it is found
to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law." 59 Giving consideration to the APA standard of review, a court must determine whether a permit was issued
60
in accordance with the CWA and NEPA.
B.

The Clean Water Act (CWA)

In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments, more commonly known as the Clean Water Act
(CWA), in an attempt to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 6 1 The CWA
prohibits the discharge of any pollutants into navigable waters of
the United States unless otherwise authorized by a permit. 62 The
Corps has the authority to grant permits allowing for discharge into
various waters. 63 The Corps must issue the permits, known as Section 404 permits, in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which were incorpo64
rated into the Corps' own regulations for the permitting process.
58. See id. at 190-93 (noting statutory review required by court).
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2006) (establishing judicial standard of review
for agency actions).
60. See Aracoma Coa4 556 F.3d at 189 (describing interplay between APA,
CWA, and NEPA).
61. See Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)
(2006)) (listing goals of Clean Water Act).

62. See id. at 623-24 (explaining that CWA defines "pollutants" as including
dredged spoil, rock, and dirt).
63. See Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (describing Corps' authority to
issue permits). The Corps may grant either individual or general permits for a
specific disposal site. See id. At issue in this case are only individual permits. See id.
General permits are used for activities determined to be similar in nature and that
result in minimal adverse incremental or cumulative impacts to waters of the U.S.
and have been the subject of extensive litigation. See generally Ohio Valley Envtl.
Coal. v. Bulen, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d 860 (S.D.
W. Va. 2009). For further discussion of the statutory framework, see supra note 56.
64. See Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp.2d at 624 (discussing origin of Corps' authority to permit valley fills). The district court in Corps of Eng'rs noted that the
underlying intent behind the guidelines for administering § 404 permits is that
dredged material should not be discharged if it will cause unacceptable adverse
impacts on the aquatic ecosystem. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.1(c)). The
guidelines require the Corps, in considering potential adverse impacts of a discharge, to determine the short- and long-term effect that the discharge will have
on: 1) the physical substrate of the proposed disposal site; 2) water circulation,
fluctuation, and salinity; 3) suspended particulate/turbidity in the vicinity of the
disposal site; 4) the introduction, relocation or addition of contaminants in the
aquatic environment; and 5) the structure and function of the aquatic ecosystem
and organisms. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.11(a)-(e)). For further discussion
of the statutory framework, see supra note 56.
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According to these EPA guidelines, the Corps may not issue a Section 404 permit if the proposed discharge would cause a significant
degradation to U.S. waters. 65 A permit may, however, still be issued
if the potential adverse impacts are minimized through "appropriate" and "practicable" steps. 66 The Section 404 permit-issuing process undertaken by the Corps involves extensive review by the
Agency, along with several state and federal agencies, as well as con67
sideration of the public's interest.
C.

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

NEPA, enacted in 1969, serves as the country's "basic national
charter for protection of the environment." 68 NEPA aims to "promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment . . . and stimulate the health and welfare of man." 69 NEPA
requires a federal agency to take a "hard look" at the environmental
consequences of a proposed action. 70 NEPA further calls for public
dissemination of relevant environmental information. 7 1 One commentator noted that NEPA possesses "appealing policy notesgood science, public participation, government reform, and protection of the environment."

72

If an agency finds that the proposed action would "significantly
affect[ ] the quality of the human environment" after taking the
65. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10 (listing instances in which Corps may not grant
§ 404 permit).
66. See id. (explaining that adverse impacts may be minimized by requiring
mitigation as a condition of permit). Mitigation may be used to minimize adverse
impacts but it must relate directly to the impacts of the proposal and be designed
to avoid, reduce, or compensate for the resource losses that are likely to occur
from the discharge. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.4(r) (1)-(2) (2008).
67. See Aracoma Coa, 556 F.3d at 191 (discussing permit review process).
68. See Corps of Eng'rs,479 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (quoting 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500.1 (a)

(2008)).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (describing design of NEPA).
70. See Corps ofEngrs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (citing U.S. Supreme Court inter-

pretation of NEPA). NEPA is a procedure-based, as opposed to a result-based, act
that only requires adverse effects of a proposed project to be identified and evaluated. See id. The Act does not require a proposed action to have substantive environmentally friendly results. Id. NEPA prohibits uninformed rather than unwise
agency action. See Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d
1232, 1240 (D. Wyo. 2005).
71. See Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (describing procedures for
agency actions required under NEPA). NEPA's purpose for supplying public information is to allow for public comment and participation in the decision making
process of the agency action. See id.
72. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA's Insatiable Optimism, 39 ENv-rh. L. REP.
NEWS & AN vsis 10618, 10618 (2009) (commenting favorably on NEPA and discussing Fourth Circuit's ruling in Aracoma Coal with disfavor for court's analysis
and holdings under NEPA scheme).
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73
requisite "hard look," NEPA requires the preparation of an EIS.
When it is unclear whether a proposed action would "significantly"
affect the environment, an agency can prepare an environmental
assessment (EA), a document less detailed than an EIS.7 4 An EA,
however, may not serve as a substitute for an EIS if the proposed
action could significantly affect the environment. 75 If an agency
concludes that the permitted action will have no significant impact
76
on the environment, the agency must then issue a FONSI.

An agency can avoid the preparation of an EIS even if the proposed action would cause significant impact by requiring the applicant to include mitigation measures in the proposed plan that will
reduce the impact below a level of significance. 77 Courts have repeatedly stated, however, that an agency must show why the proposed mitigation will reduce the action's cumulative effects below a
73. See Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (discussing NEPA review process); see also Wyo. Outdoor, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (discussing NEPA review process); Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 191 (noting that Act requires EIS for only major
federal actions that significantly impact environment). An EIS should discuss the
environmental impact of the proposed action, any adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided, and alternatives to the proposed action. See Wyo. Outdoor, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332). Congress provides assistance to federal agencies in the process by establishing the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ). See Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 625. The
CEQ oversees the implementation of assessment process and requires agencies to
consider both the "context" and the "intensity" of a proposed action in deciding
whether the action's effect on the environment reaches the level of "significance"
to require an EIS. See id. (citing and discussing CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt.
1508.27). When considering the "context," the agency's analysis focuses on the
affected geographic region and interests, while the "intensity" consideration focuses on the severity of the environmental impact on the region and interests. See
40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.27(a), (b) (2008).
74. See Wyo. Outdoor, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (noting differences between EIS
and EA); see also Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 625-26 (observing that EA simply
determines whether there will be significant impact, while EIS weighs any significant impacts against positive goals of proposed project); see also 40 C.F.R. pt.
1501.4(b) (2008) (defining EA as document that briefly provides evidence and
analysis for whether EIS is necessary or whether agency can issue FONSI); see also
33 C.F.R. pt. 230.10-230.11 (2008) (explaining Corps' requirements for issuing
EA). An EA should be a brief documentation that provides sufficient evidence and
analysis for determining whether an EIS should be prepared. See Wyo. Outdoor,351
F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
75. See Corps of Eng'rs,479 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (drawing distinction between EIS
and EA).
76. See id. at 626 (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.13 (2008)). Even if an action
would result in significant environmental effects, an agency can avoid preparing an
EIS with a mitigated FONSI. See id. (citing Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000)).
77. See Corps of Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (noting that mitigated FONSI
can allow agency to forego EIS process); see also Wyo. Outdoor, 351 F. Supp. 2d at
1240 (describing agency's decision to issue FONSI and not prepare EIS is factual
determination which implicates agency expertise).
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level of significance. 78 In O'Reilly v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (O'Reilly), 79 for example, the Fifth Circuit required the Corps
to explain why it concluded that proposed mitigation plans would
reduce the impact level below significance. 80
Numerous federal courts have dealt with challenges to the
Corps' issuance of FONSIs for CWA permitting purposes under the
NEPA regime. 81 In Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Hurst
(Hurst),82 for example, decided only a few weeks after the Fourth
Circuit handed down its order in Aracoma Coal, the Southern District Court of West Virginia was again faced with a challenge under
the CWA and NEPA to a Corps-issued fill permit in relation to
mountaintop mining. 83 In Hurst, the district court analyzed the
claims against the Corps to determine whether the Agency considered the relevant factors and whether the Corps committed a clear
error of judgment when the Corps issued the permit under the
CWA and NEPA.84 The court ultimately vacated the Corps' permit. 85 In justifying its decision, the court stated that the Corps'
78. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 477 F.3d 225, 235 (5th Cir.
2007) (requiring Corps to provide rational basis for its conclusion that impact will
be mitigated to level less than significant); see also Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888-89
(emphasizing that when agency relies on mitigation, it must provide some explanation as to how or why mitigating measures will reduce impact to insignificant
level).
79. 477 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2007).
80. See id. at 235 (noting that court has consistently accepted reliance on mitigation to reduce project's impact below level of significance, but Corps mustjustify
why mitigation plans will have such effect).
81. See generally id. (addressing Corps' issuance of FONSI when it permitted
filling of wetlands in association with property development project); Wyo. Outdoor,
351 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Wyo. 2005) (dealing with Corps' FONSI on threatened
and endangered species in relation to permit to discharge fill materials from coal
bed methane gas, which placed subsurface water on surface); Sierra Club v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (determining whether
Corps' mitigation measures were sufficient to justify FONSI under NEPA); Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2005) (assessing whether
federal agency took requisite "hard look" under NEPA when analyzing proposed
project's environmental impact on national wildlife refuge located within five
miles of proposed aircraft landing facility); Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d 1105
(9th Cir. 2000) (examining Corps' FONSI and ruling that Corps' decision was permissible under NEPA because it was based on relevant and substantial data);
Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2004) (questioning
whether Corps' decision not to prepare EIS violated NEPA).
82. 604 F. Supp. 2d 860 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (addressing Corps' issuance of
nationwide permit, opposed to individual permits at issue in Aracoma Coal but noting that analysis court performs remains same).
83. See id. at 895-96 (holding Corps' determination that cumulative impacts
under nationwide permit would be minimal was arbitrary and capricious).
84. See id. at 880 (referencing Aracoma Coal for standard of judicial review of
agency actions under APA).
85. See id. at 868 (vacating Corps' permit).
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CWA and NEPA cumulative impact determinations relied too heavily on mitigation plans intended to minimize the cumulative impact
below a level of significance without providing a rational explanation for this reliance. 86 The court also noted that while an agency
may consider mitigation plans when determining the level of environmental impact under a NEPA review, reliance on such plans to
87
make a FONSI must be justified.
The court explained that it would find the Corps' reliance on
88
mitigation justified if the mitigating proposal satisfied two factors.
The first factor requires that the proposed mitigation leading to the
FONSI "must be more than a possibility" in that the plan is "so integrated into the ...

proposal that it is impossible to define the pro-

posal without mitigation." 89 The second factor requires a level of
assurance that the mitigating measures will "constitute an adequate
buffer against the negative impacts that result from the authorized
activity to render such impacts so minor as to not warrant an EIS." 90
The Hurst court found that the Corps' permitting decision met the
first factor because the permit contained mandatory conditions for
mitigation integrated into the permit.91 The court concluded, how-

ever, that the second factor was not met because the Corps did not
produce sufficient evidence that the mitigation measures would be

86. See id. (noting that Corps did not provide rational explanation for its reliance on mitigation measures, and therefore Corps' unsupported decision to grant
permit was arbitrary and capricious).
87. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (citing O'Reilly v. U. S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 477 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2007) for proposition that agencies may con-

sider ameliorative effects of mitigation in determining impacts of activity). The
district court cited a number of federal cases to support an agency's ability to consider mitigation plans in assessing impact, but noted that the reliance on the mitigation plans must be justified by substantial evidence. See id. (relying on Sierra Club
v. US. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1224 (M.D. Fla. 2006) and Wyo.
Outdoor Council v. US. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1250 (D. Wyo.

2005)).
88. See id. at 888 (enumerating two-factor test applied by various federal
courts).

89. See id. (quoting Sierra Club, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1225).
90. See id. at 888-89 (discussing second factor of test). The district court
noted that the Corps must produce sufficient evidence that the mitigation measures will be successful. See id. at 888. Sufficient evidence can be achieved by
displaying studies conducted by the agency, or requirements for adequate monitoring of the mitigation to ensure success. See id. The court in Hurst went on to say
that although a precise and completely developed mitigation plan is not required
to support a FONSI, the Corps "must provide some explanation of how or why...
mitigation will reduce the cumulative adverse impacts ...to insignificance." Id. at
889.
91. See id. at 890 (discussing permit's proposed mitigation plans and finding
plans integral to permit).
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successful, and therefore held that the Corps' FONSI and permit92
ting decision were not justified.
In Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (Sierra
Club) ,9 a case involving the Corps' issuance of a permit authorizing
wetland fills in connection with property development,9 4 the court
utilized the two-factor test employed in Hurst.95 Satisfied that the
Corps met both factors of the Sierra Club test, the court found in
favor of the Corps. 9 6 Similar to the Hurst court, the Sierra Club

court found the first factor satisfied because the permit contained
mandatory conditions for mitigation. 9 7 The two courts differed,
however; while the Hurst court sought an adequate monitoring system to satisfy the second factor, 98 the Sierra Club court relied on
satisfactory scientific evidence to conclude that the Corps' mitigation plans carried assurances for success. 99
In Wyoming Outdoor Council v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (Wyoming Outdoor),100 the United States District Court of Wyoming employed the same two-factor test from Hurst and Sierra
Club.10 1 The Wyoming Outdoor court found that the Corps' permit
for a wetland fill must fail, reasoning that although the mitigation
was mandatory, the Corps' reliance on mitigation was not supported by a single scientific study and set forth no specific monitoring plan. 10 2 In Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps of
92. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 890-92 (finding Corps' mitigation plans

lacked assurance of success). The court observed that the Corps could have satisfied the second factor even though it did not produce any scientific evidence to
prove the likely success of mitigation. See id. at 891-92. The court stated that if the
Corps could have instead shown that the mitigation plans would be adequately

policed by a program to monitor and ensure the measures' effectiveness. See id.
93. 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (M.D. Fla. 2006), affd, 508 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir.
2007).
94. See id. at 1177 (describing property development project that requires certain wetlands filled, thus calling for CWA permit from Corps). The challenge

brought by the plaintiff environmentalist group required the court to assess the
Corps' permitting decision under the CWA and NEPA. See id.
95. See id. at 1225 (applying two-factor test used in Hurst).
96. See id. (finding that mitigating measures proposed in Corps' permit were

mandatory condition of permit, scientifically supported, and enforceable through
special conditions in permit).
97. See id. (satisfying first factor of test to justify Corps' FONSI based on pro-

posed mitigation).
98. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 891-92 (concluding second factor was

satisfied).
99. See SierraClub, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1225 (allowing Corps' scientific evidence
to satisfy second factor).

100. 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Wyo. 2005).
101. See id. at 1250 (applying two-factor test used in Hurst and Sierra Club).
102. See id. at 1250-52 (concluding that Corps' FONSI was unsupported by

reliance on mitigation measures). The court found that the first factor of the test
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Engineers (Wetlands) ,1OS the Ninth Circuit focused on the second factor of the test when reviewing a Corps decision to forego the issuance of an EIS in light of mitigation plans. 10 4 The court in Wetlands
held that where the Corps' mitigation measures were developed to
a reasonable degree, reviewed by various federal agencies, and included special conditions that were "extremely detailed," the
Corps' issuance of a FONSI was justified. 10 5 Accordingly, the court
held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in avoid10 6
ing the EIS.
When reviewing an agency's decision to grant a CWA permit, a
number of federal courts will require strict adherence to NEPA's
"hard look" requirement on the part of the agency. 10 7 NEPA's requisite "hard look" focuses the agency's attention on the cumulative
impacts of the proposed action. 10 8 Courts that strictly enforce this
"hard look" approach appear to seek and thoroughly analyze the
reasoned justification for an agency's decision to issue a CWA permit under the NEPA scheme.1 0 9
was met because the Corps' permit included mandatory mitigation. See id. at 1250.
The Corps' permitting decision failed, however, because the Corps did not supply
any scientific evidence or an adequate monitoring program to ensure the effectiveness of mitigation. See id. at 1252. The court noted that there was a monitoring
program mentioned in the proposed permit, but the plan lacked specifics, and
that the permit called for only "annual monitoring," that "may be required" to
track the mitigation results. See id. The court concluded that the monitoring plan
was not the kind of adequate policing that would make a mandatory mitigation
measure sufficient to support a FONSI. See id.
103. 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000).
104. See id. at 1121 (seeking to determine whether Corps' mitigating measures
constituted sufficient buffer against negative impacts to render impacts so minor as
to not require EIS).
105. See id. at 1121-22 (reviewing record and concluding that Corps reliance
on mitigation justified FONSI).
106. See id. (ruling in favor of Corps' decision to issue FONSI in lieu of performing EIS).
107. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d 860, 888 (S.D. W.
Va. 2009) (performing NEPA analysis of Corps' action with two-factor test); see also
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2006)
(utilizing two-factor test); Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 351 F.
Supp. 2d 1232, 1250 (D. Wyo. 2005) (applying two-factor test); Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (focusing on
second factor of test, requiring mitigation measures to constitute adequate buffer
against negative impacts from authorized activity).
108. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 191 (4th Cir.
2009) (establishing NEPA framework and requirements).
109. See, e.g., Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (performing NEPA analysis of
Corps' action with two-factor test); see also Sierra Club, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1225
(applying two-factor test); Wyo. Outdoor, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1250 (utilizing twofactor test); Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1121 (focusing on second factor of
test, requiring mitigation measures to constitute adequate buffer against negative
impacts from authorized activity).
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IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In Aracoma Coal, the Fourth Circuit's review of the district
court's decision focused primarily on the Corps' interpretation of
the CWA and NEPA, which the Corps had adopted as its own guidelines for issuing valley fill permits. 110 After laying out the complex
statutory landscape upon which the claims were based, the Fourth
Circuit began by addressing OVEC's claims arising under NEPA. 111
A. NEPA Claims
The Fourth Circuit noted that NEPA requires federal agencies
to take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of their
actions, but that the statute does not specify how an agency should
determine the scope of its NEPA analysis. 1 12 While the court did
not find guidance in the language of NEPA itself, it instead looked
to the Corps' implementing regulations.11 3 The court observed
that the appropriate scope of analysis for NEPA review, as specified
by the Corps' own guidelines, is "to address the impacts of the specific activity requiring a... [Department of the Army] permit and
those portions of the entire project over which the [Corps'] district
engineer has sufficient control and responsibility to warrant Federal review." 1" 4 The court noted that OVEC's challenge to the
scope of the Corps' NEPA review relied primarily on OVEC's misinterpretation of what constitutes a "specific activity" requiring a permit. 115

The court further observed that the "specific activity"

permitted by the Corps under a Section 404 permit is merely "the
filling of jurisdictional waters for the purpose of creating an under1 6
drain system for the larger valley fill." 1

110. See Aracoma Coa4 556 F.3d at 189 (noting all agency actions must be set

aside if found to be arbitrary or capricious).
111. See id. at 194 (discussing NEPA analysis required based on OVEC's claims
under the Act).
112. See id. (suggesting ambiguity in certain NEPA requirements).
113. See id. (examining Corps' own regulations).
114. See id. (citing 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, App. B, § 7(b)(1) (2008)).
115. See id. (discussing OVEC's challenge to Corps' NEPA analysis). OVEC's
claim was that the Corps' § 404 permit is a permit for the entire valley fill, "down to
the last shovel full of dirt at the edge of the valley." Id. The Fourth Circuit corrects
OVEC's interpretation, noting that a § 404 permit in which the Corps is authorized to permit under the CWA: ".

.

. permits, after notice and opportunity for

public hearing for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites." Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000)).
116. See Aracoma Coa4 556 F.3d at 194 (observing that Corps has no legal authority to prevent placement of fill material in areas outside waters of United
States, and that such fill activity is regulated by West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection).
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The court found support for its reasoning by calling on the
aforementioned statutory scheme for guidance; although the
Corps' Section 404 permit is central to the success of the valleyfilling process, the Corps did not retain control and responsibility
over the entire fill. 117 Citing SMCRA, the court noted that

[t]o say the Corps has
over the entire valley
mental consequences
products of the Corps

a level of control and responsibility
fill project such that 'the environof the larger project are essentially
permit action,' is to effectively read

out of the equation the . . . congressionally mandated

schema for the permitting of surface mining operations
prescribed by SMCRA.11 8
The court described the congressional intent behind the SMCRA as "clearly contemplating" the regulation of the disposal of
excess spoil and the creation of valley fills to fall under the authority of SMCRA. 119 The court further noted that by issuing a Section
404 permit, the Corps would turn a valley fill project into a "federal
action," and the state agency's regulation of the process prescribed
under the SMCRA would be rendered "at best duplicative, and, at
worst, meaningless . . . [and] NEPA plainly is not intended to re-

quire duplication of work by [the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP)] and [the Corps]."120 The court
ultimately discharged OVEC's first claim regarding the Corps' allegedly improper scope of NEPA review, ruling that because the statutory scheme provides that the state agency, the WVDEP, and not
the Corps, has "control and responsibility" over all aspects of the
valley fill projects, the Corps was not solely responsible. 12 1 The
117. See id. at 194-95 (relying on interaction between related statutory authority of SMCRA and NEPA).

118. See id. at 195 (quoting 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, App. B. § 7 (b)(2) (2008)).
119. See id. (observing that state of West Virginia has exclusive jurisdiction
over regulation of surface coal mining projects, and citing 30 U.S.C.
§ 1265 (b) (22) (D) (2006) which requires the construction of lateral drains where a

spoil disposal area contains "springs, natural water courses or wet weather seeps");
see also Kentuckians for the Commw., Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 443 (4th Cir.
2003) (noting that "it is beyond dispute that SMCRA recognizes the possibility of
placing excess spoil material in waters of the United States").
120. See Aracoma Coa 556 F.3d at 196 (suggesting that Corps' action was not

"federal action"). The court supports its supposition by citing numerous federal
regulations mentioning the desire for cooperation between federal, state and local
agencies and nonduplicative practices. See id.(explaining reasoning).
121. See id. at 197 (describing involvement of other agencies in permit review
process to show that Corps was not sole decision maker and that limiting scope of
its analysis was not incorrect).
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Corps, therefore, properly limited its scope of analysis to the filling
122
of jurisdictional waters.
1.

The Corps' Finding of No Significant Impact

The Fourth Circuit next addressed the district court's finding
that the Corps failed to adequately support both its FONSI under
NEPA and its findings of no significant degradation to waters of the
United States under the CWA.1 23 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
ruled in favor of the Corps and held that the district court's conclusions were incorrect. 124 In particular, the Fourth Circuit agreed
with the Corps' CWA analysis of the fills' impact on the structure
and function of affected streams, the sufficiency of the planned mitigating measures so as to comply with the CWA and NEPA, and the
adequacy of the Corps' CWA and NEPA assessments regarding the
cumulative impacts of the proposed fills. 125 The Fourth Circuit also
noted that the district court failed to apply an arbitrary and capriso, erred by
cious standard to the Corps' decisions and, in doing
126
substituting its judgment for that of the Agency.
The Corps' CWA Guidelines (Guidelines) require it to
"[d] etermine the nature and degree of effect that the proposed discharge will have, both individually and cumulatively, on the structure and function of the aquatic ecosystem ....,,127 Because the
Guidelines do not specifically define "function of the aquatic
ecosystem," the Fourth Circuit noted that the Corps is entitled to
rely on its "best professional judgment" when assessing aquatic impact, in addition to possible mitigating measures.' 28 The Fourth
Circuit and the district court agreed that the Guidelines neither
define "function," nor do they provide any way to evaluate function,
129
and therefore, the courts deferred to the Corps' interpretation.
122. See id. (pointing to each permit at issue, and noting that Corps was correct to limit NEPA analysis scope to jurisdictional waters, and extending analysis
beyond there to include review of environmental effects on other areas would encroach on regulatory authority of WVDEP, which administers state's SMCRA
program).
123. See id. at 197-98 (addressing Corps' FONSI).
124. See id. (reversing lower court's decision and finding in favor of Corps).
125. See Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 197-98 (ruling that Corps did not violate
CWA or NEPA in review of permits).
126. See id. at 198 (overturning lower court decision).
127. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.11 (e) (2008)) (discussing Corps' guidelines
adopted from CWA).
128. See id. (allowing Corps to rely on its best professional judgment when
guidelines are silent on certain issues).
129. See id. at 199 (explaining discrepancy between district court and Fourth
Circuit's analysis of Corps' decision-making process). The district court and
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The courts differed, however, in that the district court found that
the Corps failed to fully assess all ecological functions, or take the
requisite hard look, and provide a reasoned basis for its conclusions.130 Conversely, the Fourth Circuit found that the Corps' as-

sessment of the stream functions in the permit process was not
13 1
arbitrary and capricious, and was therefore entitled to deference.
The Fourth Circuit was particularly aware of its reviewing capacities, noting that any "attempt to define stream function beyond
[the Guidelines] would certainly be inappropriate judicial intrusion
into the Corps'. . sphere of authority."' 132 The court was also quick
to state that an agency's actions are reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard and, because no specific guidance existed to assist the Corps in assessing stream function, it would be "difficult to
13 3
understand" how the Corps could have abused its discretion.
The court concluded that the Corps was not required to engage in
full functional assessment, emphasizing that it is not a court's place
to dictate to the Corps how it should assess stream functions. 13 4
The court further observed that the reports the Corps issued with
each permit included substantial analysis and explanation regarding impact findings, based on the Corps' "best professional judgment," and, as such, the court could not say that the Corps acted
35
arbitrarily or capriciously.1

Fourth Circuit both found that the Corps' decision on how to measure "function"
should be granted deference, requiring the Corps to exercise its "best professional
judgment." Id. The district court held that the Corps, nonetheless, did not meet
its obligations to take a "hard look" at the evidence and provide a reasoned basis
for its conclusions. Id. The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, determined that
the Corps did in fact meet its obligation to utilize its "best professional judgment"
and found the Corps' analyses and permitting decisions were not arbitrary and
capricious. Id. at 199-201.
130. Aracoma Coal 556 F.3d at 199 (noting district court's holding).
131. See id. (disagreeing with lower court's holding).
132. Id. at 201 (describing dissent's approach as inappropriate judicial
intrusion).
133. Id. (finding no abuse of discretion on part of Corps).
134. Id. (deferring to Corps'judgment when making functional assessments).
"In matters involving complex predictions based on special expertise, 'a reviewing
court must generally be at its most deferential.'" Id. (quoting Baltimore Gas &Elec.
Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)).
135. Aracoma Coal 556 F.3d at 201 (concluding that Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously).
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Proposed Mitigating Measures

Next, the Fourth Circuit addressed the Corps' mitigation plans
for the valley fill permits.1 3 6 The court sought to determine
whether the plans were sufficient to justify the Corps' issuing of a
FONSI in lieu of a full EIS, as required by NEPA. l3 7 Citing the
CWA Guidelines, the court observed that a Section 404 permit cannot be issued absent "appropriate and practicable steps . . .which

will minimize potential adverse impacts of the discharge [of fill material] on the aquatic ecosystem."1 3 8 The court focused its discussion of the Corps' mitigation plans on the potential impact on
headwater streams.' 39 Initially, the district court held that the
Corps had "failed to explain how a valley fill's destruction of
headwater streams could be compensated for by . .. the [Corps'
mitigation measures] ."140 The Fourth Circuit, however, found that

the Corps was not required by the CWA Guidelines to differentiate
between headwater and other stream types when forming its mitiga14 1
tion plans.
136. See id. at 201-03 (examining proposed mitigation measures in Corps' permits to determine if it complies with CWA).
137. See id. at 201-02 (determining whether Corps' FONSI was proper or
whether Corps should have performed full EIS).
138. See id. at 202 (quoting 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10(d) (2008)). In a 1990 Memorandum of Agreement between the EPA and Corps, the two agencies agreed that
mitigation had three components: avoidance, minimization and compensatory
mitigation. See Memorandum of Agreement, Clean Water Act § 404(b) (1) Guidelines, Correction, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210-01 (Mar. 12, 1990). Avoidance was defined as
"the least environmentally damaging practical alternative." Id. Minimization can
be accomplished through practicable project modifications and permit conditions
that minimize adverse impacts. Id. Lastly, it was agreed that compensatory mitigation may be used where appropriate to compensate for unavoidable adverse impacts after all avoidance and minimization steps have been taken. Id.
Compensatory mitigation can include the restoration of existing wetlands or the
creation of new wetlands, and it is to be done as close to the discharge site as
possible. Id. The Agreement noted that the functional values lost should be carefully considered when determining compensatory mitigation, and that generally,
"in-kind" mitigation should be used. Id. The Memorandum of Agreement noted
the uncertainty of wetland creation measures, instructing that restoration options
be considered prior to creation options. Id. In the instant case, the mitigation
measures proposed in the four challenged permits included stream enhancement,
stream restoration and stream creation. Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 202.
139. See Aracoma Coal 556 F.3d at 203 (noting that role of headwater streams
in downstream ecology is of some debate both scientifically and in present
litigation).
140. Id. (discussing district court's conclusions). The district court found
that, because the Corps did not properly access stream function, "ignor[ing] a
number of crucial headwater stream values in its evaluation of adverse impact," the
mitigation plan could not adequately offset adverse impacts. Id.
141. Id. (reviewing guidelines and concluding that regardless of role
headwater streams play in overall watershed ecology, Corps is not required to
differentiate).
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The court based its conclusion on the direction offered to the
Corps in Regulatory Guidance Letter 02-02 (RGL 02-02).142 RGL
02-02 requires that where a full functional assessment is infeasible,
the only compensatory mitigation the Corps must require in a per143
mitting decision is stream replacement on a one-to-one basis.
Because nothing in the Corps' CWA guidelines mandates only inkind, on-site mitigation, the court noted that the Corps' permits
actually exceeded the minimal requirements with plans for stream
1 44
replacement at a ratio greater than one-to-one.
In his dissent, Judge Michael took issue with the majority's reliance on the language of the Regulatory Guidance Letter issued by
the Corps. 145 He noted that when analyzing the sufficiency of the
Corps' mitigation plans, the court "must begin with the provisions
that are truly mandatory: those in the regulations." 14 6 Judge
Michael went on to extract language from the Guidance Letter that
addressed situations in which "a full functional assessment is not
feasible," permitting only compensatory measures on a one-to-one
basis. 147 Judge Michael argued that a situation should not arise
where "a full functional assessment is not feasible" because the
Corps' CWA Guidelines always require the Corps to conduct such
an assessment. 148 He also opined that the majority's conclusion,
that the Corps' surrogate for assessing stream function was sufficient as part of the Corps' CWA guidelines analysis, is wholly para142. See id. at 203-04 (citing Corps' Regulatory Guidance Letter for support).
In 2002, the Corps used RGL 02-02 requiring a district "when possible" to "use
functional assessments by qualified professionals to determine impacts and compensatory mitigation requirements." Id. at 198 (explaining RGL 02-02 scheme).
The court noted that although RGL 02-02 was superseded by a 2008 amendment
to the Guidelines that altered the Corps' compensatory mitigation policy, RGL 0202 was in place at the time the Corps made its permitting decisions here and must
be considered by the court in addressing the Corps' actions. Id. at 198 n.14.
143. Id. at 204 (interpreting Corps' Regulation Guidance Letter 02-02 and its
guidelines).
144. See Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 204 (noting one of four sites granted challenged permit involved direct impact to 15,514 linear feet and required mitigation
of 43,306 feet).
145. See id. at 223-24 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(observing inconsistencies between Regulatory Guidance Letter, which was issued
by Corps to its district officers, and 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.11(e)).
146. Id. (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating
that compliance with 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.11(e) is not discretionary for Corps when
issuing § 404 permits).
147. See id. at 224 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(addressing shortcomings of Corps' RGL 02-02 and majority's interpretation).
148. Id. (Michael, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Corps'
CWA Guidelines 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.11 (e) to argue that Corps cannot rely on "illegal" provision in its RGL as justification for failure to mitigate for lost stream
functions).
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doxical and unsupportable when contrasted with the majority's
decision to allow the Corps to mitigate lost stream function because
"afull functional assessment is not feasible." 14 9
C.

The Corps' Cumulative Impact Analysis

Lastly, the Fourth Circuit determined that the Corps did not
act arbitrarily or capriciously in conducting its required cumulative
impact analysis. 150 The court held that because the Corps satisfactorily articulated its conclusion, that cumulative impacts would not be
significantly adverse after the planned mitigation, the requirements
under the CWA and those required to justify the issuance of a
FONSI under NEPA were satisfied.1 51 While the district court
found that the Corps' cumulative impact analysis failed because it
relied improperly on mitigation to negate the projects' adverse impacts, the Fourth Circuit dismissed this finding, noting that the
Corps' decision did not rest wholly on its own mitigation plans and
that it sufficiently explained its conclusion, thus justifying its FONSI
1 52
to avoid issuing a full EIS.
149. See Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 224 (Michael, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (suggesting sufficiently assessing stream function should mean
same thing under Corps' CWA Guidelines as it does in Corps' Regulatory Guidance Letter). The majority countered that the dissent's conclusion is based on
the faulty assumption that 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.11(e) (the Corps' CWA Guidelines)
requires a functional assessment. See id. at 204 n.25. The majority reminded the
dissent that the statute provides no guidance for assessing "function," beyond several factors that the Corps should and did consider. See id. Judge Michael's primary argument, however, was that the majority's position is logically unjustifiable
because it accepted the Corps' argument that stream function had been adequately assessed while permitting the Corps' to adopt mitigating measures which,
under the Corps' RGL, are to be applied only when a functional assessment is not
feasible. See id. at 224 (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150. See id. at 209 (concluding Corps' cumulative impact determinations were
not arbitrary or capricious).
151. See id. at 207 (drawing comparison with O'Reilly to determine that Corps'
mitigation measures allowed it to declare FONSI and avoid EIS). Under both the
CWA and NEPA, the Corps must consider the cumulative impacts of a proposed
project. See id. The CWA Guidelines require the Corps to reject an application for
a § 404 permit if it cannot be shown that there will be no adverse impact either
individually or in combination with known or probable impacts of other activities.
See id. Under NEPA, the Corps must determine whether the proposed project is
.related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant
impacts." Id.
152. See id. at 207-09 (holding that Corps was justified in making FONSI and
not issuing EIS). The Fourth Circuit had to reconcile the instant case with O'Reilly,
a case used to support the district court's position, where the Fifth Circuit held
that "mitigated to insignificance" is insufficient to demonstrate a lack of cumulatively significant impacts. See id. at 207. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit indicated
that the Corps in O'Reilly leaned too heavily on mitigation and that was why the
Fifth Circuit found the Corps' permit there to be inadequate. See id. at 208. The
court here observed that not only did the Corps in Aracoma Coal not lean as heavily
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the CWA and NEPA seems to
have buckled under the weight of scientific information that the
court did not wish to handle.1 5 3 Although the court ultimately
reached the proper conclusion, particularly regarding its NEPA
analysis, it could have provided a more thorough and articulated
154
basis for reaching its conclusion.
A. Fourth Circuit's Review of Corps' Mitigating Measures
The decision in Aracoma Coal hinged on the Fourth Circuit's
desire to offer a great deal of deference to the Corps' agency action. 15 5 The court warned, however, that the high level of deference agency actions ought to be granted by reviewing courts should
not equate to a judicial "rubber stamp." 15 6 The court would have
been wise to heed its own warning and complete a more thorough
analysis of the Corps' actions, particularly regarding the mitigation
measures adopted by the Corps.1 5 7 Though the court ultimately arrived at the proper conclusion, that the Corps' mitigation plansjustified judicial deference toward its FONSI, other courts faced with
on mitigation to reach a determination of insignificant adverse impact, but the
Corps also relied on the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection's
(WVDEP) CWA § 401 certification and the SMCRA permitting process. See id.
Under CWA § 401, the WVDEP is required to certify that the proposed mining
activity will not cause or contribute to a violation of state water quality standards.
See id. The court noted that the Corps sees this certification as satisfying the water
quality portion of a cumulative impact analysis. See id. The SMCRA permitting
process involves the WVDEP's assessment that probable cumulative impacts of
past, present (including the project under review), and future mining will not
damage the hydrologic balance outside the permitted area. See id.
153. See generally Rodgers, Jr., supra note 72, at 10622 (noting that NEPA promotes good science and Fourth Circuit's NEPA analysis in particular, and observing that while district court provided brilliant, creative and instructive analysis of
NEPA, Fourth Circuit produced thud in its analysis); see also Aracoma Coal 556 F.3d
at 201 (pointing out importance of reviewing court deferring to agency choice).
The Fourth Circuit provided that when reviewing matters "involving complex predictions based on special expertise, a ... court must generally be at its most deferential." Id.
154. For a further discussion of the court's holding and its need for further
explanation, see infra notes 175-87 and accompanying text.
155. See Aracoma Coa4 556 F.3d at 199 (reiterating that agency's interpretation
of own regulation is due significant deference).
156. See id. at 192 (asserting that court must engage in careful inquiry of record despite narrow standard of review).
157. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envil. Coal. v. Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d 860, 888-92 (S.D.
W. Va. 2009) (analyzing Corps' mitigation plans with thoroughness).
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similar issues have provided a more articulated and well reasoned
158
analysis in reaching their conclusions.
Only a month after the Fourth Circuit's decision in Aracoma
Coal, the District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
heard Hurst, and was again faced with a case requiring the court to
perform a CWA, NEPA and APA analysis for a fill permit granted by
the Corps. 159 The Hurst court, while fully aware of its scope for
reviewing agency actions, subjected the Corps' permitting decisions
to a thorough review and provided a reasoned analysis for its conclusion, ensuring that the court was more than a mere rubber
16 0
stamp for agency actions.

In accepting the Corps' determination that its mitigation plans
in the CWA permit were sufficient to justify its issuance of a FONSI
for purposes of NEPA, the Fourth Circuit in Aracoma Coal properly
looked to the Fifth Circuit's 2007 decision in O'Reilly.16 1 In O'Reilly,
the Fifth Circuit noted the oft-acknowledged proposition that mitigation measures may reduce a project's impacts below the level of
significance, thereby justifying a FONSI in lieu of an EIS. 162 The
Fourth Circuit correctly distinguished Aracoma Coal from O'Reilly on
the basis that while the Corps in O'Reilly relied almost exclusively on
mitigation plans to eliminate adverse impacts, the Corps in Aracoma
Coal not only cited mitigation plans, but also relied on other agen158. See, e.g., id. (providing thorough analysis of NEPA review of CWA permit
issued by Corps); Sierra Club v. US. Army Corps of Eng'rs,464 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1225
(M.D. Fla. 2006) (analyzing NEPA and CWA claims against Corps); Wyo. Outdoor
Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1250 (D. Wyo. 2005)
(hearing NEPA and CWA challenge of Corps-issued permit).
159. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (reviewing Corps' actions under CWA,
NEPA and APA). Hurst is another in the long line of mountaintop removal cases,
differing from Aracoma Coal only in that the court was reviewing a general (or
nationwide) permit granted by the Corps. See id. at 883. The court in Hurst explained that while the permit in that case was general rather than the individual
permits at issue in Aracoma Coal, the challenge in both cases involves the same
permitted activity, scope of analysis, and Corps regulations. See id. Individual permits are required for discharges that will cause greater than a minimum adverse
impact on the aquatic environment, and typically take 144 days to process. See
Ahrens et al., supra note 13, at 44 (discussing difference between individual and
general permits). General permits, on the other hand, are used for projects that
will cause only minimal adverse effects, and typically take just twenty-seven days to
process). Id.
160. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888-92 (specifying NEPA requirements for
court to find that Corps' mitigating measures justified its decision to make FONSI
instead of issuing EIS).
161. See Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 206 (distinguishing FONSI issued in
Aracoma Coal from FONSI issued in O'Reilly based on mitigation measures planned
by Corps).
162. See O'Reilly v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 477 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2007)
(noting when mitigation plans may justify a FONSI).
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cies' determinations that adverse impacts would be less than significant. 163 Once the Fourth Circuit established that the Corps'
decision to issue a FONSI based partially on mitigation plans was
sufficiently distinct from the Corps decision to do so in O'Reilly,
which the Fifth Circuit rejected as inadequate, the Fourth Circuit
essentially cut its analysis short and yielded to the Corps' decision.64 While there is no definitive test that the Fourth Circuit
failed to perform, a number of federal courts reviewing Corps-issued FONSIs have articulated a clear set of factors that provide a
thorough review of the agency action before granting deference to
165
the agency.
B. Judicial Review of Agency Actions: Not Just a Rubber Stamp?
An agency's reliance on mitigation when issuing a FONSI must
be justified by substantial evidence that supports two important factors. 166 Although the Fourth Circuit in Aracoma Coal seemed to

touch on these factors, it would have been well served to explain its
reasoning and display how the Corps' mitigation plans actually fit
within the two factors adapted and applied by other federal
courts. 167

When reviewing a Corps-issued CWA permit, many

courts perform this two-factor test to ensure that the Corps has
taken the NEPA-required "hard look" at the cumulative impacts of
the proposed action before issuing a FONSI and CWA permit. a68
The first factor requires the proposed mitigation plan associated
with the FONSI to be more than a possibility, in that it is imposed
by statute or a regulation, or that the plan is "so integrated into the
initial proposal that it is impossible to define the proposal without
163. See Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 208 (discussing Corps' reliance on not only
mitigation measures in issuing FONSI but also reliance on WVDEP's CWA § 401
certification and SMCRA permitting process).
164. See, e.g., Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 890 (providing in-depth analysis of
Corps' mitigation plans); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 464 F. Supp. 2d
1171, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (evaluating mitigating measures); Wyo. Outdoor Council
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1250 (D. Wyo. 2005) (analyzing
mitigation plans).
165. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888-90 (noting two-factor test used by various circuits in reviewing agency decision to issue FONSI based on mitigation
plans); see also Sierra Club, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1224-25 (utilizing two-factor test to
evaluate mitigation measures).
166. See Sierra Club, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (explaining support needed to
justify Corps' issuance of FONSI; see also Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (analyzing
Corps' FONSI).
167. See Aracoma Coal 556 F.3d at 205-08 (finding Corps' mitigation plans sufficient to justifying FONSI).
168. See, e.g., Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (discussing two-part test when reviewing Corps-issued FONSI in relation to CWA permit).
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mitigation." 169 The second factor requires some assurances that
the proposed mitigating measures "constitute an adequate buffer
against the negative impacts that result from the authorized activity
to render such impacts so minor as to not warrant an EIS. ' 1 70 Essentially, what courts look for under the second factor is an assur17 1
ance that the mitigation plans will be successful.
In addressing the first factor, the Fourth Circuit should have
analyzed and explained how the Corps' mitigation plans were so
integral to the permit process that the process would be impossible
to define absent the mitigation plans.1 72 The court pointed to each
of the four permits and noted the proposed mitigation plans, 173 but
it did not explicitly state that the mitigation plans were essentially
mandatory conditions integrated into the proposed permits, and
therefore could serve to satisfy the first factor and entitle the Corps
to rely on the plans. 174 Although the court's analysis in this regard
lacked thoroughness, it did reach the right conclusion; given the
court's description of the four permits' respective mitigation plans,
the first factor of the test favored by various federal courts would
175
have been satisfied.
To lend rationalized support to its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit would have been well served to analyze the Corps' mitigation
plans using the second factor from Hurst and adopted by various
169. Id. (providing first requirement that proposed mitigation must satisfy).
Moreover, the court stated, "In some instances, where the proposal itself so integrates mitigation from the beginning that it is impossible to define the proposal
without including the mitigation, the agency may then rely on the mitigation measures in determining that the overall effect would not be significant ......
Id.
(quoting Council for Environmental Quality, Most Asked Questions Concerning
CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18038
(1981)).
170. See Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, F.3d 1105, 1121
(9th Cir. 2000) (seeking assurances that mitigation plans will be successful); see also
Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (compiling cases that cite second factor considered).
171. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (summarizing second factor of test that
court used).
172. See id. (compiling cases and discussing first factor).
173. See Aracoma Coa4 556 F.3d at 202 (describing each of four permits at
issue and mitigation plans proposed for each site in permit issued by Corps).
174. See Hurst,604 F. Supp. 2d at 890 (applying first factor of test). The court
in Hurst found that certain mandatory conditions that the Corps required in its
permit could be considered integral to the project and that the Corps was justified
in relying upon it in making its FONSI. See id.
175. See Aracoma Coal 556 F.3d at 202 (discussing mitigation plan for all four
sites receiving CWA permit). The mitigation measures specific for each of the four
projects include stream restoration, stream creation and stream enhancement,
which may take the form of planting native species of trees and plants, stabilizing
stream banks, and cleaning the stream beds to improve the habitat and water quality.
Id.
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other federal courts.1 76 This criterion requires sufficient assurance
17 7
that the proposed mitigation plans will lead to actual mitigation.
Courts have found that proposed mitigation measures can be considered sufficient if the Corps provides studies showing that the
plans could lead to actual mitigation, or that the mitigation measures call for policing to ensure the efficacy of such measures. 178 In
concluding that the Corps' mitigation plans were sufficient to justify its FONSI, the Fourth Circuit properly noted certain studies and
policing measures provided by the Corps, but again failed to thoroughly articulate why the studies and policing plans sufficiently assured the court that the Corps' mitigation plans would lead to
actual mitigation. 179 Had the Fourth Circuit conformed its review
of the Corps' mitigation plan to the test applied in Hurst and cases
the district court cited therein,18 0 it could have avoided the tightrope act it endured in attempting to justify the Corps' claim that its
proposed mitigation measures had potential for success.1 81
The Corps did not provide the Fourth Circuit with a very
sturdy basis for finding assurance in the success of the mitigation
plans.18 2 The court should have instead considered the second factor of the test utilized by other courts and concluded that even if
the Corps' evidence that the mitigation measures would actually
mitigate the adverse impacts was weak or lacking, the absence of
similar successful measures could be overcome with an adequate
monitoring system to ensure the plan's effectiveness.1 8 3 The court
176. See, e.g., Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 890 (describing second criterion to
find justification for Corps' FONSI); see also Wyo. Outdoor, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1250
(outlining mitigation standards for evaluation); Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at

1121 (stating mitigating factors can justify Corps' FONSI).
177. See Wyo. Outdoor, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1250 (explaining second factor in
test and suggesting means by which second factor may be satisfied).
178. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (citing Wetlands Action Council and Wyo.
Outdoor to support conclusion).
179. See Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 205 (noting that Corps' permits included
monitoring of mitigation at each site for as much as ten years and detailed performance standards to measure and ensure success of mitigation). The court also
pointed to one similar mitigation measure taken in Kentucky, as well as an Ohio
State University study associated with the mitigation technique planned. See id.
180. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888-91 (citing various district and circuit
court opinions that applied two-factor test).
181. See Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 205 (validating Corps' claim that its method
of mitigation has potential to succeed based on dearth of support that Corps
offered).
182. See id. (observing that Corps' support for its claim that there was high
likelihood of success was lacking).
183. See Wyo. Outdoor, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1250 (suggesting that when Corps
does not provide any evidence that its proposed mitigation would be successful, it
must at least show that its mitigation process will be adequately policed). The
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in Aracoma Coal erred by only briefly mentioning the monitoring
plans that the Corps' permits required to track and ensure the success of its mitigating measures.1 8 4 A number of courts that have
applied the test ignored by the Fourth Circuit have found that
when evidence fails to sufficiently show mitigation's potential success, an adequate monitoring system can still salvage the Corps' issuance of a FONSI. 18 5 An adequate monitoring system would allow
the Corps to ensure that its mitigation measures will succeed and
18 6
result in less than significant adverse impacts.
The Fourth Circuit would have been wise to note other courts'
use of the two-factor test described in Hurst, as it would have supplied a much stronger rationale for the conclusion that the Corps'
FONSI based on the proposed mitigation plans was justified, and
thus the Corps did not issue the CWA permits arbitrarily or capriciously.' 8 7 Although the Fourth Circuit in Aracoma Coal ultimately
reached the correct conclusion-that the Corps did not violate the
CWA because the mitigation plan was sufficient to justify its FONSI
in lieu of preparing an EIS-the court's analysis should have been
more thorough. 8 8 The court's decision would have been easier to
accept had it performed the two-factor test that many other courts
89
utilize for agency actions under NEPA.1
VI.

IMPACT

The greatest impact arising from the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Aracoma Coal and other mountaintop mining cases is likely to be
felt outside of the courtroom. 190 The practice of mountaintop mining has raised the ire of many environmentalist groups and drawn
district court in Hurst noted that mitigation plans are adequately policed when the
plans include a program to monitor and ensure its effectiveness. See Hurst, 604 F.
Supp. 2d at 891. In Hurst, the court's decision that the Corps' issuance of a FONSI
was not justified hinged on the lack of specific monitoring called for in the Corps'
mitigation plan when the Corps offered no studies to support its likelihood of
success. See id.
184. See Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d at 205 (describing Corps' monitoring plans in
only a few sentences).
185. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 891 (compiling cases permitting adequate
monitoring system).
186. See Wyo. Outdoor, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1250 (explaining need for monitoring system installed by Corps to ensure mitigation is successful).
187. See Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (explaining two-factor test).
188. See, e.g., id. at 888-92 (providing thorough analysis through use of twofactor test).
189. See id. (applying two-factor test).
190. See generally Ahrens et al., supra note 13, at 44 (discussing Memorandum
of Understanding between EPA, Department of Interior, and Corps that will limit
use of general permits and increase scrutiny of individual permits).
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increasing attention from federal agencies.19 1 Recently, in an unprecedented move, the EPA used its power to revoke a previously
issued permit for a large mountaintop mining operation in West
Virginia. 192 Local politicians criticized this decision, saying it will
hurt employees and businesses alike. 1 9 3 Environmentalists, on the
other hand, praised the EPA's decision and looked to the future,
saying that the move "underscores the need for the Obama Administration to develop new regulations to end mountaintop removal
19 4
mining once and for all."'
In another move surely applauded by environmentalists, the
EPA recently announced that it will hold up seventy-nine pending
permits for surface coal mining operations to perform enhanced
review to ensure CWA compliance.1 95 Allies of the coal industry
claim that the EPA's decision to delay the permits ignores
America's need for affordable energy and hurts workers in an economically poor region. 196 Only a year into the Obama Administration, the EPA's involvement in the permit review process has

191. See id. (noting EPA's increased involvement in Corps' issuance of permits). For further discussion on the involvement of environmentalist groups in
mountaintop mining litigation, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
192. See John Raby, EPA Plans to Veto Surface Mining Permit in West Virginia,
ABC NEWS, Oct. 16, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=8849113
(last visited Feb. 13, 2010) (describing EPA's plan to revoke permit for surface
mining operation). According to the Acting EPA Regional Administrator, the
Agency's decision to revoke a permit for the first time since the CWA was enacted
"reflects the magnitude and scale of anticipation direct, indirect, and cumulative
adverse environmental impacts associated with this mountaintop removal mining
operation." Id. Officials from the mining company that sought the permit were
"shocked" by the EPA's revocation of its permit, saying that it was "the most carefully scrutinized and fully considered mine permit in West Virginia history," taking
almost ten years to complete. Id. The project was to be the largest authorized
mountaintop mining operation in Appalachia. Id.
193. See id. (noting grievances with EPA's revocation of mining operation's
permit). West Virginia Governor, Joe Manchin, a Democrat, described the EPA's
decision as a prime example of the federal government not working for the people. See id. Governor Manchin further said that the EPA is now telling employees
and the business that made investments, "No, you cannot work." Id.
194. See id. (quoting Sierra Club's opinion of EPA's move).
195. See Steve James, EPA Holds Up Coal-MiningPermits as Firms Fume, REuTERs,
Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSTRE58T
67T20090930?pageNumber=-l&virtualBrandChannel=11621 (last visited Mar. 21,
2010) (highlighting public reaction to EPA's enhance review of seventy-nine permits for surface mining).
196. See id. (observing grievances aired by coal companies and interest
groups).
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changed dramatically from that under the Bush Administration.1 9 7
Notably, the EPA did not veto a single CWA permit under Bush. 198
Federal agencies and environmentalists are not the only ones
taking notice of the controversies swirling around mountaintop
mining; legislators have recently introduced two bills in Congress
that seek to impose stricter limitations on CWA Section 404 permits
for mining purposes.1 99 The Clean Water Protection Act (H.R.
1310)200 and the Appalachia Restoration Act (S. 696),201 two bills
introduced in 2009, could preempt CWA Section 404 permits and
in turn limit the operation of mountaintop mines requiring such a
permit. 20

2

Legislators have also taken a supply-side approach by

proposing bills that prohibit public utilities within their states from
using coal from mountaintop mines in their plants. 20 3 Difficulties

are mounting for companies that wish to continue with
mountaintop mining; for example, Bank of America has determined that it will no longer extend funding to mountaintop mining
20 4
operations.
The constant flow of challenges and appeals involving
mountaintop mining has created a great deal of uncertainty in the
practice with results felt industry-wide. 20 5 The time from when a
197. See Ahrens et al., supra note 13 (contrasting Obama Administration's
EPA with that of Bush Administration).
198. See id. (noting marked difference in EPA involvement in permit review).
199. See id. (discussing two bills introduced to Congress in March 2009).
200. Clean Water Protection Act, H.R. 1310, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing
amendment to current CWA).
201. Appalachian Restoration Act, S. 696, 111th Cong. (2009) (suggesting
amendment'to Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
202. See Ahrens et al., supra note 13 (describing possible effects of new bills
introduced to curb mountaintop mining practices). Both bills would exclude overburden spoil from being considered "fill material" under the CWA. See id. This
means that the disposal of spoil could be regulated by the EPA, instead of the
Corps and would therefore be help to the stricter standards of other regulations.
See id.
203. See, e.g., Progressive Democrats of North Carolina, Pricey Harrison'sNewsletter, http://www.progressivedemocratsnc.org/blog/node/194 (last visited Mar.
21, 2010) (proposing bill that prohibits use of coal from mountaintop mining operations in North Carolina power plants). Although North Carolina has no
mountaintop mining sites itself, the proposal would still prohibit the power plants
within the State from using coal mined using the mountaintop process. See id.
204. See id. (listing disadvantages facing mountaintop mining operations and
industry).
205. See Ahrens et al., supra note 13 (noting litigation's impact on industry
when courts prevent permits from being issued or while certain cases await resolution). Often in cases brought challenging the Corps' issuance of a permit, district
courts will side with the environmentalists, but the Fourth Circuit has consistently
overturned in favor of the Corps. See id. The impact on the industry results from
the district court's decision, which may prevent or dramatically slow the issuance of
new permits until the case makes its way to an appellate court. See id. In Aracoma
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challenge to a permit is initially brought to its final adjudication
can span years. 20 6 While a case is pending or on appeal, mining
operations are often limited in the activities that they can perform,
thus limiting their productivity. 20 7 Although the proposed legislation against mountaintop mining would settle industry-wide uncertainty, the effect would be the elimination of an efficient and cheap
way to mine coal and supply energy. 20 8 As environmentalists call

for President Obama to push for a permanent ban on mountaintop
mining, the President would be wise to consider his goal of energy
independence and the role that surface coal mining plays in supply20 9
ing American-made energy before signing off on any legislation.
In the end, it looks as though the environmentalists and those who
oppose mountaintop mining will be left standing as the "kings of
the hill," with the Administration and EPA seeking to ban the practice for good through legislation, not the courts.
Michael Braverman*
Coa the time between the district courts ruling in favor of OVEC to the Fourth
Circuits reversal in favor of the Corps was nearly two years. See id. Typically during
the time between rulings, mining operations may be limited to activities that do
not require a CWA permit which could significantly impact their production capabilities. See id.
206. See generally Aracoma Coal 556 F.3d 177 (reversing case initially heard in
2007).
207. See Ahrens et al., supranote 13 (discussing effect that stream on litigation
and uncertainty has on mining industry).
208. For further discussion of cost efficiency of coal energy, see supra note 10
and accompanying text.
209. For further discussion of the United States' coal energy production, see
supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. 2008,
Guilford College.
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